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S E C R E T STATE 115348

SIPDIS, GENEVA FOR JCIC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2029  
TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [START](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [KZ](#) [UP](#) [BO](#)  
SUBJECT: U.S. PROPOSED TEXT FOR A U.S.-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT  
ON INTERIM MEASURES RELATING TO THEIR STRATEGIC  
OFFENSIVE ARMS

Classified By: Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, VCI.  
Reason: 1.4 (b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action request for Moscow (see paragraph 3).

[1](#)2. (S) BACKGROUND: The START Treaty will expire on December 5, 2009, and the new START Follow-on treaty currently being negotiated will not have entered into force by that date. Therefore, the United States seeks to agree with Russia on the continuation during this interim period of certain verification and transparency measures drawn from START. The U.S.-proposed text for a Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and Russia Regarding Certain Interim Measures Relating to Their Strategic Offensive Arms is in para 4 below. The United States seeks to reach agreement on this text before START expires.

[1](#)3. (S) ACTION REQUESTED: Drawing on the background in para 2 above, Ambassador Beyrle is requested to deliver to appropriate host government officials on Monday, November 9 the text of the U.S.-proposed agreement in paragraph 4. In so doing, he should indicate that the United States seeks a response very soon regarding whether Russia agrees this is the right step and whether Russia is willing to receive a U.S. team in Moscow to negotiate the text. The United States is prepared to send a small senior expert team led by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Karin L. Look to Moscow to negotiate the text of this agreement during the week of November 16, 2009. Ambassador Beyrle should be aware that Washington would strongly prefer a seasoned Russian negotiator who knows START very well, in order to facilitate rapid progress on this negotiation. Ambassador Strel'tsov, who for a significant period was the Russian head of the START Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, would be an excellent choice. As appropriate, Ambassador Beyrle should find a way to suggest informally that Ambassador Strel'tsov would be well suited to lead the negotiations for Russia in Moscow.

[1](#)4. (S) Begin text (Releasable to Russia):

U.S.-Proposed Text

November 4, 2009

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN  
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE  
GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
REGARDING CERTAIN INTERIM MEASURES RELATING TO THEIR  
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Recognizing that a treaty on measures for the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms will not enter into force before the expiration of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991 (the START Treaty), the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation have agreed to implement the measures described below with a view to continuing the mutual transparency regarding their strategic offensive arms provided for in the START Treaty.

The Parties agree to the following measures:

11. General Confidence Building Measures:

a) The Parties shall exchange information through diplomatic channels, or take other measures on a voluntary basis, with the aim of resolving questions that may be raised by one Party concerning the other Party's strategic offensive arms.

b) Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party when used in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

c) During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test undertakes not to encrypt or otherwise deny access to telemetric information and further undertakes to provide, upon request, copies of the recorded telemetric data of the flight and supplementary interpretative data, insofar as permissible under its domestic laws. Notwithstanding the undertakings described in the previous sentence, each party shall have the right to encrypt the telemetric information that pertains to the front section or its elements, consistent with paragraph 2 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol of the START Treaty, during no more than two flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs of an existing type under the START Treaty.

12. Notifications: Each Party shall provide to the other Party the notifications provided for in the following provisions of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the START Treaty (the Notifications Protocol): paragraphs 3, 8, and 9 of Section I; paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 9, of Section II; paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Section IV; paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Section V; paragraph 1 of Section VI; paragraphs 1, 4, and 6 of Section VII; and paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section VIII. The Parties may also provide additional notifications as they deem appropriate.

13. Transparency visits:

a) Each Party has the right to conduct up to five (5) transparency visits at facilities that were declared under the START Treaty as of December 4, 2009, and for which site diagrams were exchanged. The purpose of a monitoring visit shall be to promote transparency regarding the ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, or heavy bombers located at that facility.

b) The visiting team shall consist of no more than eight persons drawn from those individuals included in the START list of inspectors as of December 4, 2009. Their names shall be provided to the hosting Party no less than ten days in advance of their arrival at the point of entry. The Party receiving such names shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents as may be required to ensure that each person may enter and remain in the territory of the other Party throughout the in-country period.

c) The hosting Party shall treat with due respect such visiting persons in its territory in connection with the conduct of these visits, and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on the person, freedom, and

dignity of such persons.

¶4. In implementing this Memorandum, the Parties agree to apply the definitions in the Annex on Terms and Their Definitions from the START Treaty, to the extent applicable.

This Memorandum shall enter into force on the date of its signature and shall remain in force for a period of 6 months, unless superseded earlier by a treaty on measures for the further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

DONE at \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE  
GOVERNMENT OF  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:  
FEDERATION:

FOR THE  
  
THE RUSSIAN

End Text.  
CLINTON